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physically fit, and have unimpeachable
integrity and judgment." /d. at 561-62,
565 A.2d at 68o (quoting Von Raab, 109
S. Ct. at 1393). Likewise, drug use by
employees required to carry firearms
wou1d jeopardize public safety. Jd. The
court of appeals compared the work of
the customs' officers with that of police
and ftre fighters and found the City to
have similar governmental interests. Id.
at 562-63, 565 A.2d at 681. The court
noted that the police are also involved in
front-line drug interdiction within their
jurisdiction and are permitted to carry
ftrearms whether on duty or off. /d. In
addition, ftre fighters are "charged with
duties to repond quickly and effectively
at a moment's notice," and their actions
have implications on the life and property of others. /d. Thus, the court of
appeals held that the City's interest in the
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the
public outweighed the privacy interests
of the police and ftre fighters. /d. at 566,
565 A.2d at 683.
Finally, the court of appeals held that
since there was not a great privacy expectation in the drug analysis of an
employee's urine produced in regular
examinations, requiring a warrant would
add little protection to the individual's
privacy. /d. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681.
The purpose of a warrant is to protect the
privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts
of the government. /d. The court of appeals concluded that the warrant purposes were not jeopardized in United
Food because the City's program required suspicionless drug testing in the
context of an employee's physical examination. /d. at 564, 565 A.2d at 682. Consequently, the City did not exercise
discretion in determining when an employee would be tested for drugs. /d.
By its decision in United Food, the
court of appeals has adopted the prevailing law set fotth by the Supreme Court
in its decisions in Skinner and Von Raab.
Moreover, the court has broadened the
suspicionless search exception to the
fourth amendment to include drug testing of police and ftre ftghters when conducted
during
annual
physical
examinations.
-Ellen W. Cohill

Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md.
been some exceptions; as where parties
to a contract agree, in the event of litiga337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990). The court's
holding represents a departure from the
tion, the loser will bear all legal expenses,
American rule requiring each party to a
or where a statute allows an aggrieved
lawsuit provide for his or her own costs
party to recover attorney's fees. /d. at
of litigation.
345-47, 568 A.2d at 39.
Ginny Ann Smith sought compensaAfter examining Maryland Ru1e 1-341,
tory and punitive damages from David
wherein attorney's fees are imposed
Buchenroth, a pastor at St. Luke Evangelupon a party acting in bad faith, the court
ical Lutheran Church (St. Luke's). She
stated, "[i]t is reasonable, therefore, to
alleged he defamed her character and
conclude that in this state, an award of
invaded her privacy when he knowingly,
attorney's fees serves, in general, as a
or with reckless disregard for the truth,
legislative tool for punishing wrongful
communicated false statements to
conduct." /d. at 347, 568 A.2d at 39. The
church members about her sexual incourt drew a nexus between attorney's
volvement with a married church offifees imposed by statute and an award of
cial. Ms. Smith joined St. Luke's as a
punitive damages in a court proceeding.
defendant on the theory that by dismissBoth, the court observed, have as a main
ing her from her job it had ratifted the
goal the punishment of wrongful coninjurious statements of its agent, Pastor
duct. /d. at 347, 568 A.2d at 40.
Buchenroth.
Despite the court's espousal of the
At trial, the Circuit Court for MontgomAmerican rule in Empire Realty Co. v.
ery County permitted Ms. Smith to preFleisher, 269 Md. 278, 305 A.2d 144
sent evidence of the amount of her
(1973), the court distinguished the case
attorney's fees on the issue of punitive
explaining that punitive damages were
damages. The jury found in her favor and
not at issue and thus it had declined to
awarded her compensatory and punitive
decide whether fee shifting was approdamages against both Pastor Buchenroth
priate in a punitive damages case. St.
and St. Luke's.
Luke Church, 318 Md. at 348, 568 A.2d
The court of special appeals reversed,
at 40. The court, however, did agree with
holding that during jury selection Ms.
the prevailing view that attorney's fees
Smith was erroneously allowed twice the
not be considered when awarding comnumber of peremptory strikes permitted.
pensatory damages in an attempt to make
Ms. Smith sought review of the decision
the successful claimant whole. The court
in the court of appeals. St. Luke's crosssaid that where a party's wrongful conpetitioned, contending that the trial
duct warrants the imposition of punitive
court erred in allowing the jury to condamages, the remedy is appropriate. It
sider Ms. Smith's attorney's fees in its
found support for the premise in the
award of punitive damages. Both petiRestatement (Second) ofTorts § 914 and
tions were granted.
comment a (1979). St. Luke Church, 318
The peremptory strike ruling was
Md. at 350, 568 A.2d at 41.
overturned by the court which held that
The court next noted, of the seventeen
even if error had been committed the
states having considered the issue, nine
error was harmless. It then focused on
have adopted the view that in cases
the principal issue of the case -whether
where punitive damages are properly at
attorney's fees may be considered in deissue, the costs of litigation may be contermining punitive damages.
sidered in the measurement of an award.
To begin its analysis, the court review/d. at 349-50, 568 A.2d at 41. States deed the English rule which awards the
clining to follow this view contend that
costs of litigation to the prevailing party.
this form of remedy is entirely compenSt. Luke Church, 318 Md. at 344, 568
satory in nature, and not a valid means of
A.2d at 38. The rule pre-dates the time of
computing punitive damages. They also
King Henry VIII and continues to be apcontend that it improperly impinges
plied in English courts today. /d. at 344upon the jury's discretionary power to
45, 568 A.2d at 38 (citing C. McCormick,
fix the amount of punitive damages. /d.
Handbook on the Law ofDamages 234,
at 350, 568 A.2d at 41.
235 (1935)).
In response, the court of appeals
Following its declaration of indepenSt Luke Evangelical Lutheran
stated:
dence, America began a move away from
Church, Inc. v. Smith: REASONABLE
It is true that an award of attorney's
the English rule. Statutes fixing the
AITORNEY'S FEFS MAY BE
fees reimburses a plaintiff for his
amount of attorney's fees recoverable by
CONSIDERED BY TIIEJURYWHEN
out-of-pocket legal expenses. When
a successful party gave way to attorney
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
viewed solely in this light such fees
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in a
fee schedules established by a free marmay seem to be wholly compensaket. In the American system of jurispru4-3 decision held that attorney's fees of a
tory in function. Yet, when viewed
dence the notion that each litigant to a
prevailing party may now be considered
in the context of the long-standing
dispute should provide for his or her own
by a jury in determining an award of
prohibition
against
awarding
punitive damages. St. Luke Evangelical
costs of litigation evolved. There have
attorney's fees, and the fact that
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when they are awarded, they most
often serve as a statutorily-imposed
punitive measure, the need to include them in compensatory damages diminishes. Under this view,
attorney's fees would seem to be an
appropriate consideration in measuring an award of punitive damages.
Id at 350-51, 568 A2d at 41.
The court was equally unimpressed by
the argument that jury discretion would
be affected. To the contrary, the court
saw it as an opportunity to provide
needed guidance to the jury. Citing
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposa4 Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), it
pointed to the Supreme Court's concern
over the lack of direction provided to
juries in measuring the amount of punitive damages. St. Luke Church, 318 Md.
at 351-52, 568A.2d at 42. The amount of
a prevailing party's legal fees would furnish a degree of guidance to the jury not
previously provided. Id.
The court looked at the approaches
taken by certain states which allow consideration of attorney's fees in the award
of punitive damages. It rejected the Connecticut approach which limits the
award of punitive damages to the amount
of attorney's fees incurred by the prevailingparty./d. at352-53, 568A2dat42-43.
Rather, the court agreed with the Kansas
approach where the amount of
attorney's fees is merely one objective
factor for the jury to consider. Id.
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the
court of special appeals and reinstated
the jury's punitive damage award. The
decision satisfied two of the court's
goals. By presenting the jury with evidence of a prevailing claimant's
attorney's fees, the jury is provided with
helpful guidance in measuring an award
of punitive damages as well as a meaningful way to punish the wrongdoer for
flagrant misconduct.
-john A. Nolet

price-fiXing agreement was held to be a
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
Pursuant to the District of Columbia's
Criminal Justice Act (CJA), lawyers in
private practice were appointed and
compensated to represent indigent defendants in various criminal cases. With
the majority of appointments going to a
group of about 100 lawyers referred to as
"CJA regulars." These cases represented
approximately 85% of the total caseload
in the District. "After 1970, the Criminal
Justice Act set fees at $30 per hour for
court time and $20 per hour for out-ofcourt time, and despite a 147 percent
increase in the consumer price index,
compensation remained at those levels
until the boycott" occurred. Id. at 786
(Brennan,]., dissenting).
In 1982, the respondents, Superior
Court Trial
Lawyers Association
(SCTIA), unsuccessfully attempted to
persuade the District to raise rates. As a
result, in 1983, the SCTIA members met
and agreed not to accept any new cases
after September 6, 1983, unless legislation was passed providing for an increase
in rates. When the legislation was not
passed, 90% of the SCTIA members refused to accept new assignments.
The boycott had a severe impact on
the District's criminal justice system.
Within days, the District's government
offered the SCTIA a temporary increase
to $35 per hour with a permanent increase to $45 per hour for out-of-court
time and $55 per hour for court time. The
SCTIA accepted the offer and ended the
boycott.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
however, filed a complaint against the
SCTIA alleging that the agreement was a
restraint of trade and characterized the
SCTIA's conduct as a conspiracy to ftx
prices. The complaint was heard before
an administrative law judge (ALJ) who
recognized the violation of the antitrust
laws, but dismissed the complaint because the increased fees would have a
beneficial effect. The increased fees
would attract new CJA lawyers and allow
the current CJA lawyers to reduce their
caseload in order to provide better representation. /d. at 773.
The FTC disagreed, asserting that as a
result of the boycott, the city would
spend an additional4 to 5 million dollars
a year for the same legal services. Id.
Accordingly, the FTC filed a cease-anddesist order to prevent the SCTIA from
initiating a similar boycott in the future.

protection. Therefore, a restriction on
this form of expression could not be
justified unless the restriction was no
greater than what was necessary to protect an important governmental right. I d.
at 774 (citing United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The court concluded that the O'Brien test could not be
satisfied by the application of an otherwise appropriate per se rule of antitrust
law, but instead required the enforcement agency to prove, rather than presume, that the Sherman Act was violated.
Id. (citing Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n v. F. T. C, 856 F.2d 226, 248-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)). The court of appeals, therefore, vacated the cease-and-desist order
and remanded the case for a determination of whether the SCTIA actually possessed "significant market power,"
which would justify the restriction of
their first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the SCTIA's boycott was per
se violative of section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade
CommissionAct. F.T.C, 110S.Ct.at774.
As the FTC, the ALJ, and-the court of
appeals all agreed, the SCTIA's boycott
constituted a classic restraint of trade
within the meaning of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. /d. The Court rejected the
boycott's social justifications, as well the
SCTIA's objective in bringing about favorable legislation. /d. at 776. In addition,
the Court reasoned that because the
SCTIA's objective was to gain an economic advantage for those participating
in the boycott, the conduct was not protected by the first amendment. /d. at 778.
The Court pointed out that constitutional
protection does not apply "to a boycott
conducted by business competitors who
stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market." Id. at 777 (quoting Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 508 (1988)).
The Court then considered whether
the court of appeals was correct in creating a new exception to the per se rules
of antitrust liability. The court of appeals
relied on United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien violated a federal statute when he burned his Selective
Service registration certificate on the
steps of a Boston courthouse. In affirming his conviction, the Court concluded
that the statute's incidental restriction on
O'Brien's freedom of expression was no
greater than necessary to further the
government's interest in requiring registrants to have valid certificates continually available. F.T.C., 110 S. Ct. at 778. In
light of O'Brien, the court of appeals held
that the expressive component of the
SCTIA's boycott compelled the "courts

F.T.C v. SuperiorCourtTrialLawyers Ass'n: A BOYC01T BY A GROUP
OF lAWYERS CONSTI1UfED AN
AGREEMENf TO FIX PRICES IN
VIOlATION OF TilE ANTITRUST
STA1UI'ES
In F. T. C v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990),
the Supreme Court held that an agreement among a group of trial lawyers to
refuse representation of indigent criminal defendants until the government increased their compensation amounted to
price-fiXing. The Court reasoned that the
!d.
expressive component of such a boycott
The court of appeals found that the
was not protected by the ftrst amendment and did not create an exception to
SCTIA boycott contained elements of
expression warranting first amendment
the antitrust statutes. As a result, the
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